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Abstract—We propose a natural relaxation of differential
privacy based on the Re´nyi divergence. Closely related notions
have appeared in several recent papers that analyzed composition
of differentially private mechanisms. We argue that the useful
analytical tool can be used as a privacy definition, compactly and
accurately representing guarantees on the tails of the privacy loss.
We demonstrate that the new definition shares many important
properties with the standard definition of differential privacy,
while additionally allowing tighter analysis of composite hetero-
geneous mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy, introduced by Dwork et al. [1], has
been embraced by multiple research communities as a com-
monly accepted notion of privacy for algorithms on statistical
databases. As applications of differential privacy begin to
emerge, practical concerns of tracking and communicating
privacy guarantees are coming to the fore.
Informally, differential privacy bounds a shift in the output
distribution of a randomized algorithm that can be induced
by a small change in its input. The standard definition of ǫ-
differential privacy puts a multiplicative upper bound on the
worst-case change in the distribution’s density.
Several relaxations of differential privacy explored other
measures of closeness between two distributions. The most
common such relaxation, the (ǫ, δ) definition, has been a
method of choice for expressing privacy guarantees of a
variety of differentially private algorithms, especially those
that rely on the Gaussian additive noise mechanism or whose
analysis follows from composition theorems. The additive δ
parameter allows suppressing the long tails of the mechanism’s
distribution where pure ǫ-differential privacy guarantees may
not hold.
Compared to the standard definition, (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy offers asymptotically smaller cumulative loss under
composition and allows greater flexibility in the selection of
privacy-preserving mechanisms.
Despite its notable advantages and numerous applications,
the definition of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is an imperfect fit for
its two most common use cases: the Gaussian mechanism and
a composition rule. We briefly sketch them here and elaborate
on these points in the next section.
The first application of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy was the
analysis of the Gaussian noise mechanism [2]. In contrast
with the Laplace mechanism, whose privacy guarantee is
characterized tightly and accurately by ǫ-differential privacy,
a single Gaussian mechanism satisfies a curve of (ǫ(δ), δ)-
differential privacy definitions. Picking any one point on this
curve leaves out important information about the mechanism’s
actual behavior.
The second common use of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is
due to applications of advanced composition theorems. The
central feature of ǫ-differential privacy is that it is closed
under composition; moreover, the ǫ parameters of composed
mechanisms simply add up, which motivates the concept of a
privacy budget. By relaxing the guarantee to (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, advanced composition allows tighter analyses for
compositions of (pure) differentially private mechanisms. Iter-
ating this process, however, quickly leads to a combinatorial
explosion of parameters, as each application of an advanced
composition theorem leads to a wide selection of possibilities
for (ǫ(δ), δ)-differentially private guarantees.
In part to address the shortcomings of (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, several recent works, surveyed in the next section,
explored the use of higher-order moments as a way of bound-
ing the tails of the privacy loss variable.
Inspired by these theoretical results and their applications,
we propose Re´nyi differential privacy as a natural relaxation
of differential privacy that is well-suited for expressing guar-
antees of privacy-preserving algorithms and for composition
of heterogeneous mechanisms. Compared to (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, Re´nyi differential privacy is a strictly stronger privacy
definition. It offers an operationally convenient and quan-
titatively accurate way of tracking cumulative privacy loss
throughout execution of a standalone differentially private
mechanism and across many such mechanisms. Most sig-
nificantly, Re´nyi differential privacy allows combining the
intuitive and appealing concept of a privacy budget with
application of advanced composition theorems.
The paper presents a self-contained exposition of the new
definition, unifying current literature and demonstrating its
applications. The organization of the paper is as follows. Sec-
tion II reviews the standard definition of differential privacy,
its (ǫ, δ) relaxation and its most common uses. Section III in-
troduces the definition of Re´nyi differential privacy and proves
its basic properties that parallel those of ǫ-differential privacy,
summarizing the results in Table I. Section IV demonstrates a
reduction from Re´nyi differential privacy to (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, followed by a proof of an advanced composition
theorem in Section V. Section VI applies Re´nyi differential
privacy to analysis of several basic mechanisms: randomized
response for predicates, Laplace and Gaussian (see Table II for
a brief summary). Section VII discusses assessment of risk due
to application of a Re´nyi differentially private mechanism and
use of Re´nyi differential privacy as a privacy loss tracking
tool. Section VIII concludes with open questions.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND ITS FLAVORS
ǫ-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [1]. We first recall the standard
definition of ǫ-differential privacy.
Definition 1 (ǫ-DP). A randomized mechanism f : D 7→
R satisfies ǫ-differential privacy (ǫ-DP) if for any adjacent
D,D′ ∈ D and S ⊂ R
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S].
The above definition is contingent on the notion of adjacent
inputs D and D′, which is domain-specific and is typically
chosen to capture the contribution to the mechanism’s input
by a single individual.
The Laplace mechanism is a prototypical ǫ-differentially
private algorithm, allowing release of an approximate (noisy)
answer to an arbitrary query with values in Rn. The mecha-
nism is defined as
Lǫ f(x) , f(x) + Λ(0,∆1f/ǫ),
where Λ is the Laplace distribution and ℓ1-sensitivity of the
query f is
∆1f , max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1
taken over all adjacent inputs D and D′.
The basic composition theorem states that if f and g are,
respectively, ǫ1- and ǫ2-DP, then the simultaneous release
of f(D) and g(D) satisfies (ǫ1 + ǫ2)-DP. Moreover, the
mechanism g may be selected adaptively, after seeing the
output of f(D).
(ǫ, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [2]. A relaxation of ǫ-
differential privacy allows a δ additive term in its defining
inequality:
Definition 2 ((ǫ, δ)-DP). A randomized mechanism f : D 7→
R offers (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy if for any adjacent D,D′ ∈
D and S ⊂ R
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
The common interpretation of (ǫ, δ)-DP is that it is ǫ-DP
“except with probability δ”. Formalizing this statement runs
into difficulties similar to the ones addressed by Mironov et
al. [3] for a different (computational) relaxation. For any two
adjacent inputs, D1 and D2, it is indeed possible to define an
ǫ-DP mechanism that agrees with f with all but δ probability.
Extending this argument to domains of exponential sizes (for
instance, to a boolean hypercube) cannot be done without
diluting the guarantee exponentially [4]. We conclude that
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is a qualitatively different definition
than pure ǫ-DP (unless, of course, δ = 0, which we assume
not to be the case through the rest of this section).
Even for the simple case of exactly two input databases
(such as when the adversary knows the entire dataset except
whether it contains a particular record), the δ additive term
encompasses two very different modes in which privacy may
fail. In both scenarios ǫ-DP holds with probability 1− δ, they
differ in what happens with the remaining probability δ. In
the first scenario privacy degrades gracefully, such as to ǫ1-
DP with probability δ/2, to ǫ2-DP with probability δ/4, etc.
In the other scenario, with probability δ the secret—whether
the record is part of the database or not—becomes completely
exposed. The difference between the two failure modes can
be quite stark. In the former, there is always some residual
deniability; in the latter, the adversary occasionally learns the
secret with certainty. Depending on the adversary’s tolerance
to false positives, plausible deniability may offer adequate
protection, but a single (ǫ, δ)-DP privacy statement cannot
differentiate between the two alternatives. For a lively parable
of the different guarantees offered by the ǫ-DP and (ǫ, δ)-DP
definitions see McSherry [5].
To avoid the worst-case scenario of always violating privacy
of a δ fraction of the dataset, the standard recommendation
is to choose δ ≪ 1/N or even δ = negl(1/N), where N is
the number of contributors. This strategy forecloses possibility
of one particularly devastating outcome, but other forms of
information leakage remain.
The definition of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy was initially
proposed to capture privacy guarantees of the Gaussian mech-
anism, defined as follows:
Gσ f(x) , f(x) +N(0, σ
2).
Elementary analysis shows that the Gaussian mechanism can-
not meet ǫ-DP for any ǫ. Instead, it satisfies a continuum
of incomparable (ǫ, δ)-DP guarantees, for all combinations of
ǫ < 1 and σ >
√
2 ln 1.25/δ∆2f/ǫ, where f ’s ℓ2-sensitivity
is defined as
∆2f , max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖2
taken over all adjacent inputs D and D′.
There exist valid reasons for preferring the Gaussian mech-
anism over Laplace: the noise comes from the same Gaussian
distribution (closed under addition) as the error that may
already be present in the dataset; the standard deviation of the
noise is proportional to the query’s ℓ2 sensitivity, which is no
larger and often much smaller than ℓ1; for the same standard
deviation, the tails of the Gaussian (normal) distribution decay
much faster than those of the Laplace (exponential) distribu-
tion. Unfortunately, distilling the guarantees of the Gaussian
mechanism down to a single number or a small set of numbers
using the language of (ǫ, δ)-DP always leaves a possibility of
a complete privacy compromise that the mechanism itself may
not allow.
Another common reason for bringing in (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy is application of advanced composition theorems.
Consider the case of k-fold adaptive composition of an (ǫ, δ)-
DP mechanism. For any δ′ > 0 it holds that the composite
mechanism is (ǫ′, kδ + δ′)-DP, where ǫ′ ,
√
2k ln(1/δ′)ǫ +
kǫ(eǫ − 1) [6]. Note that, similarly to our discussion of the
Gaussian mechanism, a single mechanism satisfies a contin-
uum of incomparable (ǫ, δ)-DP guarantees.
Kairouz et al. give a procedure for computing an optimal
k-fold composition of an (ǫ, δ)-DP mechanism [7]. Murtagh
and Vadhan [8] demonstrate that generalizing this result to
composition of heterogeneous mechanisms (i.e., satisfying
(ǫi, δi)-DP for different ǫi’s) is #P-hard; they describe a PTAS
for an approximate solution. None of these works tackles the
problem of composing mechanisms that satisfy several (ǫ, δ)-
DP guarantees simultaneously.
(ZERO)-CONCENTRATED DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND THE
MOMENTS ACCOUNTANT. The closely related work by Dwork
and Rothblum [9], followed by Bun and Steinke [10], explore
privacy definitions—Concentrated Differential Privacy and
zero-Concentrated Differential Privacy—that are framed using
the language of, respectively, subgaussian tails and the Re´nyi
divergence. The main difference between our approaches is
that both Concentrated and zero-Concentrated DP require a
linear bound on all positive moments of a privacy loss variable.
In contrast, our definition applies to one moment at a time.
Although less restrictive, it allows for more accurate numerical
analyses.
The work by Abadi et al. [11] on differentially private
stochastic gradient descent introduced the moments accountant
as an internal tool for tracking privacy loss across multiple
invocations of the Gaussian mechanism applied to random
subsets of the input dataset. The paper’s results are expressed
via a necessarily lossy translation of the accountant’s output
(bounds on select moments of the privacy loss variable) to the
language of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
Taken together, the works on Concentrated DP, zero-
Concentrated DP, and the moments accountant point towards
adopting Re´nyi differential privacy as an effective and flexible
mechanism for capturing privacy guarantees of a wide variety
of algorithms and their combinations.
OTHER RELAXATIONS. We briefly mention other relaxations
and generalizations of differential privacy.
Under the indistinguishability-based Computational Differ-
ential Privacy (IND-CDP) definition [3], the test of closeness
between distributions on adjacent inputs is computationally
bounded (all other definitions considered in this paper hold
against an unbounded, information-theoretic adversary). The
IND-CDP notion allows much more accurate functionalities
in the two-party setting [12]; in the traditional client-server
setup there is a natural class of functionalities where the gap
between IND-CDP and (ǫ, δ)-DP is minimal [13], and there
are (contrived) examples where the computational relaxation
permits tasks that are infeasible under information-theoretic
definitions [14].
Several other works, most notably the Pufferfish and
the coupled-worlds frameworks [15], [16], propose different
stability constraints on the output distribution of privacy-
preserving mechanisms. Although they differ in what distri-
butions are compared, their notion of closeness is the same as
in (ǫ, δ)-DP.
III. RE´NYI DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
We describe a generalization of the notion of differential
privacy based on the concept of the Re´nyi divergence. Con-
nection between the two notions has been pointed out before
(mostly for one extreme order, known as the Kullback-Leibler
divergence [6], [17]); our contribution is in systematically
exploring the relationship and its practical implications.
The (parameterized) Re´nyi divergence is classically defined
as follows [18]:
Definition 3 (Re´nyi divergence). For two probability distribu-
tions P and Q defined over R, the Re´nyi divergence of order
α > 1 is
Dα(P‖Q) , 1
α− 1 log Ex∼Q
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α
.
(All logarithms are natural; P (x) is the density of P at x.)
For the endpoints of the interval (1,∞) the Re´nyi diver-
gence is defined by continuity. Concretely, D1(P‖Q) is set to
be limα→1Dα(P‖Q) and can be verified to be equal to the
Kullback-Leibler divergence (also known as relative entropy):
D1(P‖Q) = Ex∼P log P (x)
Q(x)
.
Note that the expectation is taken over P , rather than over
Q as in the previous definition. It is possible, though, that
D1(P‖Q) thus defined is finite whereas Dα(P‖Q) = +∞
for all α > 1.
Likewise,
D∞(P‖Q) = sup
x∈suppQ
log
P (x)
Q(x)
.
For completeness, we reproduce in the Appendix proper-
ties of the Re´nyi divergence important to the sequel: non-
negativity, monotonicity, probability preservation, and a weak
triangle inequality (Propositions 8–11).
The relationship between the Re´nyi divergence with α =∞
and differential privacy is immediate. A randomized mecha-
nism f is ǫ-differentially private if and only if its distribution
over any two adjacent inputs D and D′ satisfies
D∞ (f(D)‖f(D′)) ≤ ǫ.
It motivates exploring a relaxation of differential privacy
based on the Re´nyi divergence.
Definition 4 ((α, ǫ)-RDP). A randomized mechanism f : D 7→
R is said to have ǫ-Re´nyi differential privacy of order α, or
(α, ǫ)-RDP for short, if for any adjacent D,D′ ∈ D it holds
that
Dα (f(D)‖f(D′)) ≤ ǫ.
Remark 1. Similarly to the definition of differential privacy, a
finite value for ǫ-RDP implies that feasible outcomes of f(D)
for some D ∈ D are feasible, i.e., have a non-zero density,
for all inputs from D except for a set of measure 0. Assuming
that this is the case, we let the event space be the support of
the distribution.
Remark 2. The Re´nyi divergence can be defined for α smaller
than 1, including negative orders. We are not using these orders
in our definition of Re´nyi differential privacy.
The standard definition of differential privacy has been
successful as a privacy measure because it simultaneously
meets several important criteria. We verify that the relaxed
definition inherits many of the same properties. The results of
this section are summarized in Table I.
“BAD OUTCOMES” GUARANTEE. A privacy definition is only
as useful as its guarantee for data contributors. The simplest
such assurance is the “bad outcomes” interpretation. Consider
a person, concerned about some adverse consequences, de-
liberating whether to withhold her record from the database.
Let us say that some outputs of the mechanism are labeled
as “bad.” The differential privacy guarantee asserts that the
probability of observing a bad outcome will not change (either
way) by more than a factor of eǫ whether anyone’s record is
part of the input or not (for appropriately defined “adjacent”
inputs). This is an immediate consequence of the definition of
differential privacy, where the subset S is the union of bad
outcomes.
This guarantee is relaxed for Re´nyi differential privacy.
Concretely, if f is (α, ǫ)-RDP, then by Proposition 10:
e−ǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S]α/(α−1) ≤ Pr[f(D) ∈ S]
≤ (eǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S])(α−1)/α .
We discuss consequences of this relaxation in Section VII.
ROBUSTNESS TO AUXILIARY INFORMATION. Critical to the
adoption of differential privacy as an operationally useful
definition is its lack of assumptions on the adversary’s knowl-
edge. More formally, the property is captured by the Bayesian
interpretation of privacy guarantees, which compares the ad-
versary’s prior with the posterior.
Assume that the adversary has a prior p(D) over the set
of possible inputs D ∈ D, and observes an output X of an
ǫ-differentially private mechanism f . Its posterior satisfies the
following guarantee for all pairs of adjacent inputs D,D′ ∈ D
and all X ∈ R:
p(D |X)
p(D′|X) ≤ e
ǫ p(D)
p(D′)
.
In other words, evidence obtained from an ǫ-differentially
private mechanism does not move the relative probabilities
assigned to adjacent inputs (the odds ratio) by more than eǫ.
The guarantee implied by RDP is a probabilistic statement
about the change in the Bayes factor. Let the random variable
R(D,D′) be defined as follows:
R(D,D′) ∼ p(D
′|X)
p(D |X) =
p(X |D′) · p(D′)
p(X |D ) · p(D ) ,
where X ∼ f(D).
It follows immediately from definition that the Re´nyi diver-
gence of order α between P = f(D′) and Q = f(D) bounds
the α-th moment of the change in R:
EQ
[{
Rpost(D,D
′)
Rprior(D,D′)
}α]
= EQ
[
P (x)αQ(x)−α
]
=
exp[(α− 1)Dα(f(D′)‖f(D))].
By taking the logarithm of both sides and applying Jensen’s
inequality we obtain that
Ef(D) [logRpost(D,D
′)− logRprior(D,D′)] ≤
Dα(f(D)‖f(D′)). (1)
(This can also be derived by observing that
Ef(D) [logRpost(D,D
′)− logRprior(D,D′)] =
D1(f(D)‖f(D′))
and by monotonicity of the Re´nyi divergence.)
Compare (1) with the guarantee of pure differential privacy,
which states that logRpost(D,D
′) − logRprior(D,D′) ≤ ǫ
everywhere, not just in expectation.
POST-PROCESSING. A privacy guarantee that can be dimin-
ished by manipulating output is unlikely to be useful. Con-
sider a randomized mapping g : R 7→ R′. We observe that
Dα(P‖Q) ≥ Dα(g(P )‖g(Q)) by the analogue of the data
processing inequality [19, Theorem 9]. It means that if f(·)
is (α, ǫ)-RDP, so is g(f(·)). In other words, Re´nyi differential
privacy is preserved by post-processing.
PRESERVATION UNDER ADAPTIVE SEQUENTIAL COMPOSI-
TION. The property that makes possible modular construction
of differentially private algorithms is self-composition: if f(·)
is ǫ1-differentially private and g(·) is ǫ2-differentially private,
then simultaneous release of f(D) and g(D) is ǫ1 + ǫ2-
differentially private. The guarantee even extends to when
g is chosen adaptively based on f ’s output: if g is indexed
by elements of R and gX(·) is ǫ2-differentially private for
any X ∈ R, then publishing (X,Y ), where X ∼ f(D) and
Y ∼ gX(D), is ǫ1 + ǫ2-differentially private.
We prove a similar statement for the composition of two
RDP mechanisms.
Proposition 1. Let f : D 7→ R1 be (α, ǫ1)-RDP and g : R1×
D 7→ R2 be (α, ǫ2)-RDP, then the mechanism defined as
(X,Y ), where X ∼ f(D) and Y ∼ g(X,D), satisfies
(α, ǫ1 + ǫ2)-RDP.
Proof. Let h : D 7→ R1×R2 be the result of running f and g
sequentially. We writeX , Y , and Z for the distributions f(D),
g(X,D), and the joint distribution (X,Y ) = h(D). X ′, Y ′,
and Z ′ are similarly defined if the input is D′. Then
exp [(α− 1)Dα(h(D)‖h(D′))]
=
∫
R1×R2
Z(x, y)αZ ′(x, y)1−α dxdy
=
∫
R1
∫
R2
(X(x)Y (x, y))α(X ′(x)Y ′(x, y))1−α dy dx
=
∫
R1
X(x)αX ′(x)1−α
{∫
R2
Y (x, y)αY ′(x, y)1−α dy
}
dx
≤
∫
R1
X(x)αX ′(x)1−α dx · exp((α− 1)ǫ2)
≤ exp((α − 1)ǫ1) exp((α − 1)ǫ2)
= exp((α − 1)(ǫ1 + ǫ2)),
from which the claim follows.
Significantly, the guarantee holds whether the releases of f
and g are coordinated or not, or computed over the same or
different versions of the input dataset. It allows us to operate
with a well-defined notion of a privacy budget associated with
an individual, which is a finite resource consumed with each
differentially private data release.
Extending the concept of the privacy budget, we say that the
Re´nyi differential privacy has a budget curve parameterized by
the order α. We present examples illustrating this viewpoint
in Section VI.
GROUP PRIVACY. Although the definition of differential pri-
vacy constrains a mechanism’s outputs on pairs of adjacent
inputs, its guarantee extends, in a progressively weaker form,
to inputs that are farther apart. This property has two im-
portant consequences. First, the differential privacy guarantee
degrades gracefully if our assumptions about one person’s
influence on the input are (somewhat) wrong. For example,
a single family contributing to a survey will likely share
many socio-economic, demographic, and health characteris-
tics. Rather than collapsing, the differential privacy guarantee
will scale down linearly with the number of family members.
Second, the group privacy property allows preprocessing input
into a differentially private mechanism, possibly amplifying (in
a controlled fashion) one record’s impact on the output of the
computation.
We define group privacy using a notion of c-stable transfor-
mation [20]. We say that g : D 7→ D′ is c-stable if g(A) and
g(B) are adjacent in D′ implies that there exists a sequence of
length c+1 so that D0 = A, . . . , Dc = B and all (Di, Di+1)
are adjacent in D.
The standard notion of differential privacy satisfies the
following. If f is ǫ-differentially private and g : D′ 7→ D is c-
stable, then f◦g is cǫ-differentially private. A similar statement
holds for Re´nyi differential privacy.
Proposition 2. If f : D 7→ R is (α, ǫ)-RDP, g : D′ 7→ D is
2c-stable and α ≥ 2c+1, then f ◦ g is (α/2c, 3cǫ)-RDP.
Proof. We prove the statement for c = 1, the rest follows by
induction.
Define h = f ◦ g. Since g is 2-stable, it means that for any
adjacent D,D′ ∈ D′ there exist A ∈ D, so that g(D) and A,
A and g(D′) are adjacent in D.
By Corollary 4 and monotonicity of the Re´nyi divergence,
we have that h = f ◦ g satisfies
Dα/2(h(D)‖h(D′)) ≤
α− 1
α− 2Dα(h(D)‖h(A))+
Dα−1(h(A)‖h(D′)) ≤ 3ǫ.
IV. RDP AND (ǫ, δ)-DP
As we observed earlier, the definition of ǫ-differential
privacy coincides with (∞, ǫ)-RDP. By monotonicity of the
Re´nyi divergence, (∞, ǫ)-RDP implies (α, ǫ)-RDP for all
finite α.
In turn, an (α, ǫ)-RDP implies (ǫδ, δ)-differential privacy
for any given probability δ > 0.
Proposition 3 (From RDP to (ǫ, δ)-DP). If f is an (α, ǫ)-RDP
mechanism, it also satisfies (ǫ+ log 1/δα−1 , δ)-differential privacy
for any 0 < δ < 1.
Proof. Take any two adjacent inputs D and D′, and a subset
of f ’s range S. To show that f is (ǫ′, δ)-differentially private,
where ǫ′ = ǫ + 1α−1 log 1/δ, we need to demonstrate that
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ′ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] + δ. In fact, we prove a
stronger statement that Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ max(eǫ′ Pr[f(D′) ∈
S], δ).
Recall that by Proposition 10
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ {eǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S}1−1/α.
Denote Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] by Q and consider two cases.
Case I. eǫQ > δα/(α−1). Continuing the above,
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ {eǫQ}1−1/α = eǫQ · {eǫQ}−1/α
≤ eǫQ · δ−1/(α−1)
= exp
(
ǫ +
log 1/δ
α− 1
)
·Q.
Case II. eǫQ ≤ δα/(α−1). This case is immediate since
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ {eǫQ}1−1/α ≤ δ,
which completes the proof.
A more detailed comparison between the notions of RDP
and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy that goes beyond these reduc-
tions is deferred to Section VII.
V. ADVANCED COMPOSITION THEOREM
The main thesis of this section is that the Re´nyi differential
privacy curve of a composite mechanism is sufficient to draw
non-trivial conclusions about its privacy guarantees, similar to
the ones given by other advanced composition theorems, such
as Dwork et al. [6] or Kairouz et al. [7]. Although our proof
is structured similarly to Dwork et al. (for instance, Lemma 1
is a direct generalization of [6, Lemma III.2]), it is phrased
entirely in the language of Re´nyi differential privacy without
making any (explicit) use of probability arguments.
Lemma 1. If P and Q are such that D∞(P‖Q) ≤ ǫ and
D∞(Q‖P ) ≤ ǫ, then for α ≥ 1
Dα(P‖Q) ≤ 2αǫ2.
Proof. If α ≥ 1 + 1/ǫ, then
Dα(P‖Q) ≤ D∞(P‖Q) = ǫ ≤ (α − 1)ǫ2.
Property Differential Privacy Re´nyi Differential Privacy
Change in probability of outcome S
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ (eǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S])(α−1)/α
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≥ e−ǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≥ e−ǫ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S]α/(α−1)
Change in the Bayes factor
Rpost(D,D′)
Rprior(D,D′)
≤ eǫ always E
[{
Rpost(D,D′)
Rprior(D,D′)
}α]
≤ exp[(α− 1)ǫ]
Change in log of the Bayes factor |∆logR(D,D′)| ≤ ǫ always E[∆ logR(D,D′)] ≤ ǫ
Post-processing f is ǫ-DP (or (α, ǫ)-RDP) ⇒ g ◦ f is ǫ-DP (or (α, ǫ)-RDP, resp.)
Adaptive sequential composition (basic) f, g are ǫ-DP (or (α, ǫ)-RDP) ⇒ (f, g) is 2ǫ-DP (resp., (α, 2ǫ)-RDP)
Group privacy, pre-processing f is ǫ-DP (or (α, ǫ)-RDP), g is 2c-stable ⇒ f ◦ g is 2cǫ-DP (resp., (α/2c , 3cǫ)-RDP)
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF PROPERTIES SHARED BY DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AND RDP.
Consider the case when α < 1 + 1/ǫ. We first observe that
for any x > y > 0, λ = log(x/y), and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1/λ the
following inequality holds:
xβ+1y−β + x−βyβ+1 = x · eβλ + y · e−βλ
≤ x(1 + βλ + (βλ)2) + y(1− βλ+ (βλ)2)
= (1 + (βλ)2)(x + y) + βλ(x − y). (2)
Since all terms of the right hand side of (2) are positive, the
inequality applies if λ is an upper bound on log x/y, which
we use in the argument below.
exp[(α− 1)Dα(P‖Q)]
=
∫
R
P (x)αQ(x)1−α dx
≤
∫
R
{
P (x)αQ(x)1−α +Q(x)αP (x)1−α
}
dx− 1
(by nonnegativity of Dα(Q‖P ))
≤
∫
R
{
(1 + (α− 1)2ǫ2)(P (x) +Q(x))+
(α− 1)ǫ|P (x)−Q(x)|} dx− 1
(by (2) for β = α− 1 ≤ 1/ǫ)
= 1 + 2(α− 1)2ǫ2 + (α− 1)ǫ‖P −Q‖1.
Taking the logarithm of both sides and using that log(1+x) <
x for positive x we find that
Dα(P‖Q) ≤ 2(α− 1)ǫ2 + ǫ‖P −Q‖1. (3)
Observe that
‖P −Q‖1 =
∫
|P (x)−Q(x)| dx
=
∫
R
min(P (x), Q(x))
∣∣∣∣max(P (x), Q(x))min(P (x), Q(x)) − 1
∣∣∣∣ dx
≤ min(2, eǫ − 1) ≤ 2ǫ2.
Plugging the bound on ‖P−Q‖1 into (3) completes the proof.
The claim for α = 1 follows by continuity.
The constant in Lemma 1 can be improved to .5 via a
substantially more involved analysis [10, Proposition 3.3] (see
also )
Proposition 4. Let f : D 7→ R be an adaptive composition of
n mechanisms all satisfying ǫ-differential privacy. Let D and
D′ be two adjacent inputs. Then for any S ⊂ R:
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Pr[f(D′) ∈ S]
)
· Pr[f(D′) ∈ S].
Proof. By applying Lemma 1 to the Re´nyi differential privacy
curve of the underlying mechanisms and Proposition 1 to their
composition, we find that for all α ≥ 1
Dα(f(D)‖f(D′)) ≤ 2αnǫ2.
Denote Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] by Q and consider two cases.
Case I: log 1/Q ≥ ǫ2n. Choosing with some foresight α =√
log 1/Q/(ǫ
√
n) ≥ 1, we have by Proposition 10 (probability
preservation):
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ {exp[Dα(f(D)‖f(D′)] ·Q}1−1/α
≤ exp(2(α− 1)nǫ2) ·Q1−1/α
< exp
(
ǫ
√
n log 1/Q− (logQ)/α
)
·Q
= exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q.
Case II: log 1/Q < ǫ2n. This case follows trivially, since
the right hand side of the claim is larger than 1:
exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q ≥ exp (2 log 1/Q) ·Q = 1/Q > 1.
The notable feature of Proposition 4 is that its privacy
guarantee—bounded probability gain—comes in the form that
depends on the event’s probability. We discuss this type of
guarantee in Section VII.
The following corollary gives a more conventional (ǫ, δ)
variant of advanced composition.
Corollary 1. Let f be the composition of the n ǫ-differentially
private mechanisms. Let 0 < δ < 1 be such that log(1/δ) ≥
ǫ2n. Then f satisfies (ǫ′, δ)-differential privacy where
ǫ′ , 4ǫ
√
2n log(1/δ).
Proof. Let D and D′ be two adjacent inputs, and S be some
subset of the range of f . To argue (ǫ′, δ)-differential privacy
of f , we need to verify that
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ eǫ′ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
In fact, we prove a somewhat stronger statement, namely that
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ max(eǫ′ Pr[f(D′) ∈ S], δ).
By Proposition 4
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Pr[f(D′) ∈ S]
)
· Pr[f(D′) ∈ S].
Denote Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] by Q and consider two cases.
Case I: 8 log 1/δ > log 1/Q. Then
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q
< exp
(
2ǫ
√
8n log 1/δ
)
·Q
(by 8 log 1/δ > log 1/Q)
= exp (ǫ′) ·Q.
Case II: 8 log 1/δ ≤ log 1/Q. Then
Pr[f(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Q
)
·Q
≤ exp
(
2
√
log 1/δ · log 1/Q
)
·Q
(since log(1/δ) ≥ ǫ2n)
≤ exp
(√
1/2 log 1/Q
)
·Q
(since 8 log 1/δ ≤ log 1/Q)
= Q1−1/
√
2 ≤ Q1/8
≤ δ. (ditto)
Remark 3. The condition log(1/δ) ≥ ǫ2n corresponds to the
so-called “high privacy” regime of the advanced composition
theorem [7], where ǫ′ < (1+
√
2) log(1/δ). Since δ is typically
chosen to be small, say, less than 1%, it covers the case of
ǫ′ < 11. In other words, if log(1/δ) > ǫ2n, this and other
composition theorems are unlikely to yield strong bounds.
VI. BASIC MECHANISMS
In this section we analyze Re´nyi differential privacy of three
basic mechanisms and their self-composition: randomized
response, Laplace and Gaussian noise addition. The results
are summarized in Table II and plotted for select parameters
in Figures 1 and 2.
A. Randomized response
Let f be a predicate, i.e., f : D 7→ {0, 1}. The Randomize
Response mechanism for f is defined as
RRp f(D) ,
{
f(D) with probability p
1− f(D) with probability 1− p .
The following statement can be verified by direct application
of the definition of Re´nyi differential privacy:
Proposition 5. Randomized Response mechanism RRp(f)
satisfies
(
α,
1
α− 1 log
(
pα(1− p)1−α + (1− p)αp1−α)) -RDP
if α > 1, and
(
α, (2p− 1) log p
1− p
)
-RDP
if α = 1.
B. Laplace noise
Through the rest of this section we assume that f : D 7→ R
is a function of sensitivity 1, i.e., for any two adjacentD,D′ ∈
D: |f(D)− f(D′)| ≤ 1.
Define the Laplace mechanism for f of sensitivity 1 as
Lλ f(D) = f(D) + Λ(0, λ),
where Λ(µ, λ) is Laplace distribution with mean µ and scale
λ, i.e., its probability density function is 12λ exp(−|x−µ|/λ).
To derive the RDP budget curve for the exponential mech-
anism we compute the Re´nyi divergence for Laplace distribu-
tion and its offset.
Proposition 6. For any α ≥ 1 and λ > 0:
Dα(Λ(0, λ)‖Λ(1, λ)) = 1
α− 1 log
{
α
2α− 1 exp
(
α− 1
λ
)
+
α− 1
2α− 1 exp
(−α
λ
)}
.
Proof. For continuous distributions P and Q defined over the
real interval with densities p and q
Dα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1 log
∫ ∞
−∞
p(x)αq(x)1−α dx.
Mechanism Differential Privacy Re´nyi Differential Privacy for α
Randomized Response
∣∣∣log p1−p
∣∣∣ α > 1: 1α−1 log
(
pα(1 − p)1−α + (1− p)αp1−α
)
α = 1: (2p − 1) log p
1−p
Laplace Mechanism 1/λ
α > 1: 1
α−1
log
{
α
2α−1
exp(α−1
λ
) + α−1
2α−1
exp(−α
λ
)
}
α = 1: 1/λ+ exp(−1/λ) − 1 = .5/λ2 +O(1/λ3)
Gaussian Mechanism ∞ α/(2σ2)
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF RDP PARAMETERS FOR BASIC MECHANISMS.
To compute the integral for p(x) = 12λ exp(−|x|/λ) and
q(x) = 12λ exp(−|x − 1|/λ), we evaluate it separately over
the intervals (−∞, 0], [0, 1] and [1,+∞].∫ +∞
−∞
p(x)αq(x)1−α dx =
1
2λ
∫ 0
−∞
exp(αx/λ + (1− α)(x − 1)/λ) dx
+
1
2λ
∫ 1
0
exp(−αx/λ+ (1− α)(x − 1)/λ) dx
+
1
2λ
∫ +∞
1
exp(−αx/λ− (1− α)(x − 1)/λ) dx
=
1
2
exp((α − 1)/λ)
+
1
2(2α− 1) (exp((α − 1)/λ)− exp(−α/λ))
+
1
2
exp(−α/λ)
=
α
2α− 1 exp((α − 1)/λ) +
α− 1
2α− 1 exp(−α/λ),
from which the claim follows.
Since the Laplace mechanism is additive, the Re´nyi diver-
gence between Lλ f(D) and Lλ f(D
′) depends only on α
and the distance |f(D) − f(D′)|. Proposition 6 implies the
following:
Corollary 2. If real-valued function f has sensitiv-
ity 1, then the Laplace mechanism Lλ f satisfies (α,
1
α−1 log
{
α
2α−1 exp(
α−1
λ ) +
α−1
2α−1 exp(−αλ )
}
)-RDP.
Predictably,
lim
α→∞
Dα(Λ(0, λ)‖Λ(1, λ)) = D∞(Λ(0, λ)‖Λ(1, λ)) = 1
λ
.
This is, of course, consistent with the Laplace mechanism sat-
isfying 1/λ-differential privacy. The other extreme evaluates
to the following expression limα→1Dα(Λ(0, λ)‖Λ(1, λ)) =
1/λ+ exp(−1/λ)− 1, which is well approximated by .5/λ2
for large λ.
C. Gaussian noise
Assuming, as before, that f is a real-valued function, the
Gaussian mechanism for approximating f is defined as
Gσ f(D) = f(D) +N(0, σ
2),
where N(0, σ2) is normally distributed random variable with
standard deviation σ2 and mean 0.
The following statement is a closed-form expression of the
Re´nyi divergence between a Gaussian and its offset (for a more
general version see [19], [21]).
Proposition 7. Dα(N(0, σ
2)‖N(µ, σ2)) = αµ2/(2σ2).
Proof. By direct computation we verify that
Dα(N(0, σ
2)‖N(µ, σ2))
=
1
α− 1 log
∫ ∞
−∞
1
σ
√
2π
exp(−αx2/(2σ2))
· exp(−(1− α)(x − µ)2/(2σ2)) dx
=
1
α− 1 log
1
σ
√
2π
∫ ∞
−∞
exp[(−x2+
2(1− α)µx − (1− α)µ2)/(2σ2)] dx
=
1
α− 1 log
{
σ
√
2π
σ
√
2π
exp
[
(α2 − α)µ2/(2σ2)]
}
= αµ2/(2σ2).
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 3. If f has sensitivity 1, then the Gaussian mech-
anism Gσ f satisfies (α, α/(2σ
2))-RDP.
Observe that the RDP budget curve for the Gaussian mech-
anism is particularly simple—a straight line (Figure 1). Recall
that the (adaptive) composition of RDP mechanisms satisfies
Re´nyi differential privacy with the budget curve that is the sum
of the mechanisms’ budget curves. It means that a composition
of Gaussian mechanisms will behave, privacy-wise, “like” a
Gaussian mechanism. Concretely, a composition of n Gaussian
mechanisms each with parameter σ will have the RDP curve
of a Gaussian mechanism with parameter σ/
√
n.
D. Privacy of basic mechanisms under composition
The “bad outcomes” interpretation of Re´nyi differential
privacy ties the probabilities of seeing the same outcome
under runs of the mechanism applied to adjacent inputs. The
dependency of the upper bound on the increase in probability
on its initial value is complex, especially compared to the
standard differential privacy guarantee. The main advantage
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Fig. 1. (α, ǫ)-Re´nyi differential privacy budget curve for three basic mechanisms with varying parameters.
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Fig. 2. Various privacy guarantees of the randomized response with parameter p = 51% (top row) and the Laplace mechanism with parameter λ = 20
(bottom row) under self-composition. The x-axis is the number of compositions (1–250). The y-axis, in log scale, is the upper bound on the multiplicative
increase in probability of event S, where S’s initial mass is either 10−6 (left), 10−3 (center), or .1 (right). The four plot lines are the “naı¨ve” nǫ bound
(blue); optimal choice (ǫ, δ) in the standard advanced composition theorem (red); generic bound of Proposition 4 (blue); optimal choice of α in Proposition 10
(cyan).
of this more involved analysis is that for most parameters the
bound becomes tighter.
In this section we compare numerical bounds for several
analyses of self-composed mechanisms (see Figure 2), pre-
sented as three sets of graphs, where Pr[f(D) ∈ S] takes
values 10−6, 10−3, and 10−1.
Each of the six graphs in Figure 2 (three probability
values × {randomized response, Laplace}) plots bounds in
logarithmic scale on the relative increase in probability of S
(i.e., Pr[f(D′) ∈ S]/Pr[f(D) ∈ S]) offered by four analyses.
The first, “naı¨ve”, bound follows from the basic composition
theorem for differential privacy and, as expected, is very
pessimistic for all but a handful of parameters. A tighter,
advanced composition theorem [6], gives a choice of δ, from
which one computes ǫ′ so that the n-fold composition satisfies
(ǫ′, δ)-differential privacy. The second curve plots the bound
for the optimal (tightest) choice of (ǫ′, δ). Two other bounds
come from Re´nyi differential privacy analysis: our generic
advanced composition theorem (Proposition 4) and the bound
of Proposition 10 for the optimal combination of (α, ǫ) from
the RDP curve of the composite mechanism.
Several observations are in order. The RDP-specific analysis
for both mechanisms is tighter than all generic bounds whose
only input is the mechanism’s differential privacy parameter.
On the other hand, our version of the advanced composition
bound (Proposition 4) is consistently outperformed by the
standard (ǫ, δ)-form of the composition theorem, where δ is
chosen optimally. We elaborate on this distinction in the next
section.
VII. DISCUSSION
Re´nyi differential privacy is a natural relaxation of the
standard notion of differential privacy that preserves many
of its essential properties. It can most directly be compared
with (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, with which it shares several
important characteristics.
PROBABILISTIC PRIVACY GUARANTEE. The standard “bad
outcomes” guarantee of ǫ-differential privacy is independent
of the probability of a bad outcome: it may increase only by
a factor of exp(ǫ). Its relaxation, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy,
allows for an additional δ term, which allows for a complete
privacy compromise with probability δ.
In stark contrast, Re´nyi differential privacy even with very
weak parameters never allows a total breach of privacy with
no residual uncertainty. The following analysis quantifies this
assurance.
Let f be (α, ǫ)-RDP with α > 1. Recall that for
any two adjacent inputs D and D′, and an arbitrary prior
p the odds function R(D,D′) ∼ p(D)/p(D′) satisfies
E
[{
Rpost(D,D
′)
Rprior(D,D′)
}α−1]
≤ exp((α − 1)ǫ). By Markov’s in-
equality Pr[Rpost(D,D
′) > βRprior(D,D′)] < eǫ/β1/(α−1).
For instance, if α = 2, the probability that the ratio between
two posteriors increases by more than the β factor drops off
as O(1/β).
BASELINE-DEPENDENT GUARANTEES. The Re´nyi differen-
tial privacy bound gets weaker for less likely outcomes. For
instance, if f is a (10.0, .1)-RDP mechanism, an event of
probability .5 under f(D) can be as large as .586 and as
small as .419 under f(D′). For smaller events the range is (in
relative terms) wider. If the probability under f(D) is .001,
then Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] ∈ [.00042, 0.00218]. For Pr[f(D) ∈
S] = 10−6 the range is wider still: Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] ∈
[.195 · 10−6, 4.36 · 10−6].
Contrasted with the pure ǫ-differential privacy this type
of guarantee is conceptually weaker and more onerous in
application: in order to decide whether the increased risk is
tolerable, one is required to estimate the baseline risk first.
However, in comparison with (ǫ, δ)-DP the analysis via
Re´nyi differential privacy is simpler and, especially for prob-
abilities that are smaller than δ, leads to stronger bounds.
The reason is that (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy often arises as
a result of some analysis that implicitly comes with an ǫ-δ
tradeoff. Finding an optimal value of (ǫ, δ) given the baseline
risk may be non-trivial, especially in closed form. Contrast the
following two, basically equivalent, statements of advanced
composition theorems (Proposition 4 and its Corollary 1):
Let f : D 7→ R be an adaptive composition of n
mechanisms all satisfying ǫ-differential privacy for
ǫ ≤ 1. Let D and D′ be two adjacent inputs. Then
for any S ⊂ R, by Proposition 4:
Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
2ǫ
√
n log 1/Pr[f(D) ∈ S]
)
· Pr[f(D) ∈ S].
or, by Corollary 1,
Pr[f(D′) ∈ S] ≤ exp
(
4ǫ
√
2n log 1/δ
)
· Pr[f(D) ∈ S] + δ,
where 0 < ǫ, δ < 1 such that log(1/δ) ≥ ǫ2n.
Given some value of baseline risk Pr[f(D) ∈ S], which
formulation is easier to interpret? We argue that it is the
former, since the (ǫ, δ) form has a free parameter (δ) that
ought to be optimized in order to extract a tight bound that
Proposition 4 gives directly.
The use of (ǫ, δ) bounds gets even more complex if we con-
sider a composition of heterogeneous mechanisms. It brings
us to the last point of comparison between (ǫ, δ)- and Re´nyi
differential privacy measures.
KEEPING TRACK OF ACCUMULATED PRIVACY LOSS. A finite
privacy budget associated with an individual is an intuitive and
appealing concept, to which ǫ-differential privacy gives a rig-
orous mathematical expression. Cumulative loss of differential
privacy over the cause of a mechanism run, a protocol, or one’s
lifetime can be tracked easily thanks to the additivity property
of differential privacy. Unfortunately, doing so naı¨vely likely
exaggerates privacy loss, which grows sublinearly in the num-
ber of queries with all but negligible probability (via advanced
composition theorems).
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once for α restricted to {1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 32, 64,+∞}. The curves for two choices of α are nearly identical. Right: corresponding values of
α in log scale.
Critically, applying advanced composition theorems breaks
the convenient abstraction of privacy as a non-negative real
number. Instead, the guarantee comes in the (ǫ, δ) form that
effectively corresponds to a single point on an implicitly
defined curve. Composition of multiple, heterogeneous mech-
anisms makes applying the composition rule optimally much
more challenging, as one may choose various (ǫ, δ) points to
represent their privacy (in the analysis, not during the mech-
anisms’ run time!). It begs the question of how to represent
the privacy guarantee of a complex mechanism: distilling it
to a single number throws away valuable information, while
publishing the entire (ǫ, δ) curve shifts the problem to the
aggregation step. (See Kairouz et al. [7] for an optimal bound
on composition of homogeneous mechanisms and Murtagh
and Vadhan [8] for hardness results and an approximation
scheme for composition of mechanisms with heterogeneous
privacy guarantees.)
Re´nyi differential privacy restores the concept of a pri-
vacy budget, thanks to its composition rule: RDP curves for
composed mechanisms simply add up. Importantly, the α’s
of (α, ǫ)-Re´nyi differential privacy do not change. If RDP
statements are reported for a common set of α’s (which
includes +∞, to keep track of pure differential privacy), RDP
of the aggregate is the sum of the reported vectors. Since the
composition theorem of Proposition 4 takes as an input the
mechanism’s RDP curve, it means that the sublinear loss of
privacy as a function of the number of queries will still hold.
For an example of this approach we tabulate the bound
on privacy loss for an iterative mechanism consisting of
three basic mechanisms: randomized response, Gaussian, and
Laplace. Its RDP curve is given, in the closed form, by
application of the basic composition rule to RDP curves of
the underlying mechanisms (Table II). The privacy guarantee
is presented in Figure 3 for three values of the baseline risk:
.1, .001, and 10−6. For each set of parameters two curves
are plotted: one for an optimal value of α from (1,+∞],
the other for an optimal α restricted to the set of 13 values
{1.5, 1.75, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 16, 32, 64,+∞}. The two curves
are nearly identical, which illustrates our thesis that reporting
RDP curves for a restricted set of α’s preserves tightness of
privacy analysis.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We put forth the proposition that Re´nyi divergence yields
useful insight into analysis of differentially private mecha-
nisms. Among our findings
• Re´nyi differential privacy (RDP) is a natural generaliza-
tion of pure differential privacy.
• RDP shares, with some adaptations, many properties that
make differential privacy a useful and versatile tool.
• RDP analysis of Gaussian noise is particularly simple.
• A composition theorem can be proved based solely on
the properties of RDP, which implies that RDP packs
sufficient information about a composite mechanism as
to enable its analysis without consideration of its compo-
nents.
• Furthermore, an RDP curve may be sampled in just a few
points to provide useful guarantees for a wide range of
parameters. If these points are chosen consistently across
multiple mechanisms, this information can be used to
estimate aggregate privacy loss.
Naturally, multiple questions remain open. Among those
• As Lemma 1 demonstrates, the RDP curve of a differen-
tially private mechanism is severely constrained. Making
fuller use of these constraints is a promising direction,
in particular towards formal bounds on tightness of RDP
guarantees from select α values.
• Proposition 10 (probability preservation) is not tight when
Dα(P‖Q) → 0. We expect that P (A) → Q(A) but the
bound does not improve beyond P (A)(α−1)/α.
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APPENDIX
For comprehensive exposition of properties of the Re´nyi
divergence we refer to two recent papers [19], [22]. Here we
recall and re-prove several facts useful for our analysis.
Proposition 8 (Non-negativity). For 1 ≤ α and arbitrary
distributions P,Q
Dα(P‖Q) ≥ 0.
Proof. Assume that α > 1. Define φ(x) , x1−α and g(x) ,
Q(x)/P (x). Then
Dα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1 log EP [φ(g(x))]
≥ 1
α− 1 logφ(EP [g(x)])
= 0
by the Jensen inequality applied to the convex function φ. The
case of α = 1 follows by letting φ to be log 1/x.
Proposition 9 (Monotonicity). For 1 ≤ α < β and arbitrary
P,Q
Dα(P‖Q) ≤ Dβ(P‖Q).
Proof (following [19]). Assume that α > 1. Observe that the
function x 7→ xα−1β−1 is concave. By Jensen’s inequality
Dα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1 log EP
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α−1
=
1
α− 1 log EP
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)(β−1)α−1
β−1
≤ 1
α− 1 log
{
EP
(
P (x)
Q(x)
)β−1}α−1β−1
= Dβ(P‖Q).
The case of α = 1 follows by continuity.
The following proposition appears in Langlois et al. [23],
generalizing Lyubashevsky et al. [24].
Proposition 10 (Probability preservation [23]). Let α > 1,
P and Q be two distributions defined over R with identical
support, A ⊂ R be an arbitrary event. Then
P (A) ≤ (exp[Dα(P‖Q)] ·Q(A))(α−1)/α .
Proof. The result follows by application of Ho¨lder’s inequal-
ity, which states that for real-valued functions f and g, and
real p, q > 1, such that 1/p+ 1/q = 1,
‖fg‖1 ≤ ‖f‖p‖g‖q.
By setting p , α, q , α/(α − 1), f(x) , P (x)/Q(x)1/q ,
g(x) , Q(x)1/q , and applying Ho¨lder’s, we have
∫
A
P (x) dx ≤
(∫
A
P (x)αQ(x)1−α dx
) 1
α
(∫
A
Q(x) dx
)α−1
α
≤ exp[Dα(P‖Q)](α−1)/αQ(A)(α−1)/α,
completing the proof.
The most salient feature of the bound is its (often non-
monotone) dependency on α: as α approaches 1, Dα(P‖Q)
shrinks (by monotonicity of the Re´nyi divergence) but the
power to which it is raised goes to 0, pushing the result in the
opposite direction. Several our proofs proceed by finding the
optimal, or approximately optimal, α minimizing the bound.
The Re´nyi divergence is not a metric: it is not symmetric
and it does not satisfy the triangle inequality. A weaker variant
of the triangle inequality tying together the Re´nyi divergence
of different orders does hold. Its general version is presented
below.
Proposition 11 (Weak triangle inequality). Let P,Q,R be
distributions on R. Then for α > 1 and for any p, q > 1
satisfying 1/p+ 1/q = 1 it holds that
Dα(P‖Q) ≤ α− 1/p
α− 1 Dpα(P‖R) +Dq(α−1/p)(R‖Q).
Proof. By Ho¨lder’s inequality we have:
exp[(α− 1)Dα(P‖Q)]
=
∫
R
P (x)αQ(x)1−α dx
=
∫
R
P (x)α
R(x)α−1/p
R(x)α−1/p
Q(x)α−1
dx
≤
{∫
R
P (x)pα
R(x)pα−1
dx
}1/p{∫
R
R(x)qα−q/p
Q(x)qα−q
dx
}1/q
= exp[(α− 1/p)Dpα(P‖R)]·
exp[(α− 1)Dqα−q/p(R‖Q)].
By taking the logarithm and dividing both sides by α− 1 we
establish the claim.
Several important special cases of the weak triangle inequal-
ity can be obtained by fixing parameters p and q (compare it
with [25, Lemma 12] and [23, Lemma 4.1]):
Corollary 4. For P,Q,R with common support we have
1) Dα(P‖Q) ≤ α−1/2α−1 D2α(P‖R) +D2α−1(R‖Q).
2) Dα(P‖Q) ≤ αα−1D∞(P‖R) +Dα(R‖Q).
3) Dα(P‖Q) ≤ Dα(P‖R) +D∞(R‖Q).
4) Dα(P‖Q) ≤ α−α/βα−1 Dβ(P‖R) + Dβ(R‖Q), for some
explicit β = 2α− .5 +O(1/α).
Proof. All claims follow from the weak triangle inequality
(Proposition 11) where p and q are chosen, respectively, as
1) p = q = 2.
2) p→∞ and q , p/(p− 1)→ 1.
3) q →∞ and p , q/(q − 1)→ 1.
4) such that αp = αq − 1 and 1/p+ 1/q = 1.
In the last case β , pα = 2α− .5 +O(1/α).
